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Abstract: This article argues that the emergence of the Western question of
rationality can only be understood in its dynamics and evolution from the
correlation between philosophical/theological/scientific institution and
strong objectivity, which can only be achieved by a scientific institutional
praxis, something that common sense and common people cannot achieve-
perform. The Platonic model of scientific institution as centralizing and
monopolizing the epistemological-political grounding, imposing it directly
on common sense and common people, is based on the idea that strong
epistemological-moral objectivity is the normative condition to the sense,
framing, legitimation and guiding of common sense and common people.
This correlation between scientific institution and strong objectivity leads
to strong institutionalism regarding the constitution, the legitimation and
the social foment of the valid knowledge and valid culture, again from the
contraposition to common sense and common people. Here, scientific
institutions acquire a role of judge and guide of social evolution as a whole.
The paper’s central argument is that such Platonic association between
scientific institution and rationality (or epistemological-moral objectivity
as a product of scientific institution) must be deconstructed in favor of
common sense and common people, that is, in favor of democracy as the
basis of the epistemological-moral grounding, which implies, as a
consequence, the institutional weakening and even abandonment of that
Platonic self-understanding which associates scientific institution and
objectivity.
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The emergence of rationality: a philosophical essay
 Resumo: o artigo argumenta que a emergência, no Ocidente, da questão
da racionalidade somente pode ser entendida em sua dinâmica e em sua
evolução a partir da correlação entre instituição filosófica/teológica/científica
e objetividade forte, no sentido de que tal objetividade forte apenas pode
ser fundada por meio de uma práxis científica institucional, algo que o
senso comum e as pessoas comuns não permitem e não podem fazer. O
modelo platônico de instituição científica enquanto centralizando e
monopolizando a fundamentação epistemológico-política, impondo-a
diretamente ao senso comum e às pessoas comuns, está baseado na ideia de
que a objetividade epistemológico-moral forte é a condição normativa do
sentido como um todo, é a condição para o enquadramento, a legitimação
e o fomento social do conhecimento e da cultura válidos, novamente a
partir da contraposição ao senso comum e às pessoas comuns. Aqui, a
instituição científica adquire um papel de juiz e de guia em relação à evolução
social como um todo. O argumento central do artigo consiste em que tal
ligação platônica entre instituição científica e racionalidade (ou objetividade
epistemológico-moral enquanto produto da instituição científica) deve ser
desconstruída em favor do senso comum e das pessoas comuns, isto é, em
favor da democracia como base da fundamentação epistemológico-moral,
o que significa, como consequência, o enfraquecimento e mesmo o abandono
institucionais daquele auto-entendimento platônico que liga instituição
científica e objetividade.
Palavras-Chave: Racionalidade. Cientificismo. Fundamentação.
Objetividade. Democracia.
Introduction
In a class of Introduction to Philosophy, while discussing the book
VII of Plato’s Republic, a student asked me why we study rationality,
the Greek in particular and, afterwards, the Western question of
rationality in general. I had never asked myself about this problem, at
least not in detail, although I had some notions and epistemological-
political positions regarding the concept of rationality and its
institutional use by the academia. My first answer at that moment was
something that was very agreeable to me: “To show that rationality–as
a scientific methodology of thinking, grounding and speaking, and also
as a methodology of living–is not pure; to show that rationality is a
mixture of many practices, senses and symbols which have common
sense and everyday life as their basis”. From there to here, such question
has streamlined my thoughts on the sense of philosophy as an
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institutional community, activity and matter which is different from
common sense, since philosophers are something other than common
people, because, when we talk about rationality as the common ground
to different philosophies, we are referring to a concept of institutional
philosophy which flourishes with the purpose of overcoming and at the
same time framing and guiding common sense and common people.
That is Plato’s model of philosophy as seen in the Allegory of the Cave,
that is, an institutional philosophy produced by a closed community with
particular procedures, practices and codes. Such a philosophy overcomes
common sense in order to achieve a scientific worldview (ascendant
dialectics) and, by doing that, acquires epistemological-political
legitimacy to frame and guide common sense and common people based
on a metaphysical notion of human nature, truth and others (descendant
dialectics), a kind of essentialist and naturalized basis which is very
objective (see PLATO, 2002, VII, 514a-541b, p. 315-359).
The first thing that can be understood about the question of
rationality is that it establishes an institutional scientific notion of
philosophy which is opposed to common sense and common people:
this is the first step to the comprehension of the Platonic model of
philosophy adopted as the hegemonic epistemological-political paradigm
for Western philosophy/theology/science. It is such a strong
contraposition that it came to be used in the 20th century by Martin
Heidegger in his The Essence of Truth, where he opposes, as basis and
motto for metaphysical inquiring, self-understanding and constitution,
common sense’s prison of the immediately useful and philosophy’s
inquiry for essence, uncritical common sense and philosophy as a critical
scientific praxis (see HEIDEGGER, 1991, p. 329-330). The second step is
the Platonic affirmation that epistemological-moral universalism is the
condition to relativism, particularism, subjectivism, in a way that it
can triumph over skepticism. Relativism, particularism or subjectivism
is harmful because it leads to an epistemological-political “anything
goes”; universalism leads to epistemological-moral objectivity, enabling
both the institutional grounding of objective values that prevents the
rabble’s epistemological-moral confusion and lack of clarity and the
individual life from an essential notion of wisdom contrary to a common
life as determined by natural instincts (see PLATO, 2002, I, 336b-354c,
p. 19-51; 2002, VII, 517c, p. 319, 1991a, p. 164; 1991b, p. 331-
442; ARISTOTLE, 1984a, BOOK I, CHAPTER II, A4-5, p. 14). Heidegger’s
The Essence of Truth agrees with Plato’s philosophy in this particular
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point regarding the superiority of the question of essence in relation to
common sense’s living guided by what is immediately useful (see
HEIDEGGER, 1991, p. 329).
The third step of institutional philosophy is the assumption of a
model of human nature – or metaphysical-ontological essence – as the
basis of the philosophical/theological/scientific institutional praxis both
in terms of institutional grounding and of philosophical/theological/
scientific institution’s social rooting. This is the normative basis and
political consequence of institutional constitution, grounding and
political action. It legitimizes strong institutionalism regarding the
foundation of institutional philosophical/theological/scientific contents
insofar as institutions centralize and monopolize the construction of
knowledge (denying it to common sense and common people) and,
accordingly, the legitimation of social evolution, which becomes an
institutional matter and praxis based on an essentialist and naturalized
foundation, assumed by an institutional self-authorized legal staff located
beyond common man/woman (see ARISTOTLE, 1984b, 1094b, p. 49;
1984b, 1102a-1102b, p. 62-63). The fourth step is the affirmation of
the philosophical purity and asepsis both in terms of normative
constitution and of everyday life, again from the contraposition to
common sense and common people (see PLATO, 2002, VII, 516b-e,
p. 318; 1991a, p. 149-158; ARISTOTLE, 1984b, 1095a, p. 51). Likewise,
such fourth step also implies institutional objectivity regarding the
creation and use of philosophical/theological/scientific theories when
institutions are compared to the normative confusion of common sense,
the integrity of the intellectual versus the crudity of the multitudes. In
this article, I develop these intuitions concerning the constitution,
foundation and social boosting of philosophical/theological/scientific
institutions, their legal staff and contents as the Platonic heritage which
was assumed as the basic paradigm of Western philosophy/theology/
science. My essay has not the aim of reconstructing step by step the
history of Western rationality and the many traditions which were fused
in this long and contradictory historical, theoretical and cultural process.
It intends only to provide general observations which characterize the
Platonic and Western search for a rational conception and grounding as
a kind of correlation and mutual-support of strong institutionalism
and strong objectivity concerning the constitution, legitimation and
social boosting of an institutional scientific worldview to common sense
Conjectura: Filos. Educ., Caxias do Sul, v. 22, n. 1, p. 11-31, jan./abr. 2017 1 5
Leno Francisco Danner
and common people. As a consequence, it does not aim at denying
philosophical/theological/scientific institution as the basis of
constitution, legitimation and social foment of essentialist and
naturalized foundations (or at least of valid scientific knowledge), but
to problematize what kinds of institutional foundation and interpretation
of rationality can be sustained in our contemporary pluralist and relativist
world to both philosophical-theological-scientific institutions and
popular cultures.
The Platonic Model of Foundation and the Emergence of
Rationality
The Platonic model of epistemological-moral foundation is
constructed from the understanding that common sense and common
people are not capable of grounding an objective and critical scientific
worldview. Common sense is a set of non-scientific practices and codes,
insofar as common people are fundamentally guided by their natural
instincts, which means that common sense and common people are
not rational regarding their constitution and action over time. I consider
the Allegory of the Cave as the clearest proof of this Platonic starting
point: Human nature without education, without philosophical
orientation and grounding, is purely and simply a cave where people
live their lives based on ignorance and darkness–which is shown by the
metaphoric association between cave and darkness and knowledge and
light. As a consequence, it is necessary to escape the cave in order to
achieve the light of truth and salvation (see PLATO, 2002, VII). Now,
why is it necessary to escape the cave? Because common sense means
ignorance, and ignorance means and leads to darkness. Such Platonic
starting point leads to the legitimation of a metaphysical order which is
the condition of evaluation and legitimation of common sense and
common people, since this metaphysical order can overcome the cave
itself, at least in the sense that a philosophical institution based on a
metaphysical order has legitimacy to frame and guide common sense
and common people. In other words, a philosophical institution based
on an essentialist and naturalized foundation substitutes the crudity
and lack of epistemological-moral objectivity of common sense and
common people with scientific contents, practices and legal staffs.
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Here the open opposition to common sense and common people is
seen as the basic starting point of Plato’s metaphysics, something that
even Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, G. W. F. Hegel in the 19th
century and Martin Heidegger in the 20th century used in their
reformulations of the Platonic metaphysical legacy, maintaining the
aristocratic institutional self-comprehension which was Plato’s starting
point (see KANT, 2001; HEGEL, 1992; HEIDEGGER, 1991). Reason is
something different from common sense, and opposed to it. The
philosopher is different from the common man and opposed to him. In
both cases, the philosophical-theological-scientific institution becomes
the condition of truth of common sense and common people, so all the
current values, practices and subjects can and must be framed, evaluated,
guided and determined from philosophical-theological-scientific
institutions and their objective codes, practices, procedures and legal
staff. It is interesting that the philosophical question, subject and
institution emerge from common sense (as a common matter, a current
social-cultural problem) and as common man (a person or a group of
daily life). In other words, the philosopher comes from common sense,
since he is first and foremost a common man, although he gradually
assumes a very institutionalized and specialized practice, procedure and
staff. The basic metaphor for metaphysics is the idea that knowledge
starts from common sense, overcoming it by scientific institutional praxis;
it is in that moment that scientific praxis is self-conscious of its
evolutionary course and epistemological-political constitution, as can
be seen in Hegel’s phenomenology of the spirit – in other words, the
self-consciousness of the epistemological-moral-ontological objectivity
only is possible in the moment that science is institutionalized; when
knowledge is rooted into the common sense, as common sense, there is
not self-reflexivity and self-consciousness of that epistemological-moral-
ontological objectivity, which means also that common man cannot
achieve such a strong objectivity. A correlation between philosophical
institution, objectivity, truth and criticism emerges and defines the
scientific and institutional sense of rationality as determining its
constitution, legitimation and use over time by Western philosophical-
theological-scientific traditions which constitute themselves from the
opposition to common sense and common people, involving at the same
time the epistemological-political self-legitimation in terms of the
superiority of philosophical-theological-scientific institutions and their
leadership regarding common sense and common people. From medieval
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times, Catholic theology, based on the idea of plenitude potestatis, or of
the theory of two swords, has definitely adopted, within Western
institutional (political, juridical, educational, scientific and others)
culture, the Platonic normative notion that is characterized both by
such contraposition between philosophical-theological-scientific
institution and common sense and common people, and by the
consequent correlation among scientific institution, objectivity, truth
and criticism, contrarily to common sense’s and common people’s crudity
and ignorance concerning this correlation.
It is from such double contraposition that concepts like
homogeneity versus heterogeneity, unity versus plurality, objectivity versus
partiality are established as epistemological steps both in terms of the
institutions’ scientific constitution, its self-understanding and self-
delimitation regarding common sense and common people, and of the
mutual relationships between philosophy/theology/science and common
sense, between philosopher/theologian/scientist and common man (see
PLATO, 2002, VII, 517a-541b, p. 319-359; 2003, I-LII, p. 1-55). These
last contrapositions are based on the notion of daily life as an uncritical
heterogeneous world of instinctive and bestialized common people.
Those conceptual oppositions mean that science is directed to strong
objectivity, to the essential, to the universal, which overcomes the
confusion and lack of clarity of pluralism. Institutional science–and
science always means institutional science, according to Plato’s
epistemological-political understanding and legacy–starts with the
Allegory of the Cave in order to understand and constitute itself in relation
to common sense, and this enables the legitimation of a very clear and
aseptic barrier between institutional science and common sense, between
the scientist and the common man. Therefore, such barrier, which allows
the scientific institution’s self-understanding regarding common sense
and common people, acquires a political role that will define, once and
for all, the conflicts between science and common sense as much as the
starting point of scientific institution, namely the comprehension of
common sense as a dark and rough cave inhabited by epistemologically
and morally fallen beings. Here, the light of salvation comes from an
institutional scientific praxis which overcomes the crudity of common
sense by means of the negation of common sense as a valid instance in
terms of speaking, acting and grounding. Common sense has nothing
to say to institutional science; as a consequence, it has nothing to
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contribute to political praxis. This Platonic notion of institutional science
is so strong that it will be drawn upon by Karl Marx in the 19th century:
philosophy is the head of the theory and practice of revolution while
the proletariat is its heart and hands – and since the classical age we
know that the hands obey the head, and not the contrary (see Marx,
2001; Rorty, 2010).
Now, how can the self-comprehension of scientific institution sustain
such strong and aseptic barrier between, on the one hand, its procedures,
practices, codes and legal staff, and, on the other, common sense and
common people? How is the contraposition between homogeneity and
heterogeneity, unity and plurality, objectivity and partiality, sustained
by institutional philosophy/theology/science, possible? It is made
possible through the scientific institutional defense of an essentialist
and naturalized foundation as condition to criticize and orientate, as a
condition of truth and emancipation, to ground the objective
epistemological-political point of view. Indeed, here is the secret of Plato’s
model of philosophy which was adopted by medieval theology, modern
natural science and modern philosophy as the basis of their internal
self-structuration and general self-comprehension, of their
epistemological-moral foundations, as well as of their contacts with
common sense and common people: the strong objectivity of their
contents, practices and procedures which would be based on an
essentialist and naturalized foundation. Such an essentialist and
naturalized foundation could only be understood from institutional
procedures, practices and legal staff which would have the conditions
to achieve, by its internal constitution, an objective worldview that
could not be performed by common people based on common sense.
But this institutional objectivity based on an essentialist and naturalized
foundation must sustain, as the condition of institutional legitimacy
and superiority regarding common sense and common people, a
metaphysical model of human nature and a theological/natural hierarchy
of the things that are the only normative paradigm capable of framing,
criticizing and guiding common sense and common people. In other
words, the Platonic opposition between philosophical/theological/
scientific institution and common sense and common people is only
possible through the institutional defense of an essentialist and
naturalized order which is located beyond common sense and common
people, since it is not accessed by common people from an analysis of
common sense. Such an essentialist and naturalized foundation, which
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could only be accessed by institutional procedures, codes and legal staff,
cannot be confused or associated with common sense and common
people, because it is metaphysical, that is, an institutional construction
and form of grounding, which means that institutional science and its
legal staff centralize and monopolize both institutional functioning over
time and its social foment of scientific practices and codes by centralizing
and monopolizing the understanding of this metaphysical order. Here,
institutional science becomes the epistemological and the political basis
of social constitution and evolution.
The history of Western institutional philosophy/theology/science
is based on this Platonic notion of an essentialist and naturalized
foundation, since it is permeated and streamlined by the institutional
attempt to ground an objective essentialist and naturalized foundation
as condition of truth, justification, criticism and guidance of common
sense and common people from the correlation between scientific and
political and educational institutions – that is, the association between
truth and political power that Michel Foucault discusses in his works
(see Foucault, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). The Platonic basic intuition, the
epistemological-moral objectivity as the condition to criticize, frame
and intervene, as a condition to the evolution of common sense and
common people, institutes truth as the basis of political power:
Institutional science grounds an objective notion of truth that legitimizes
a political institutional structuration and political institutional action
into the social dimension as a correlative characteristic and consequence
of the Platonic model of institutional science. Now, the Platonic model
of institutional science based on an essentialist and naturalized
foundation as the condition to criticize, frame and guide common sense
and common people is based on an misleading notion of essential
objectivity which generates an institutional illusion of power that not
only puts the institution–its internal procedures, codes, practices and
legal staff – as opposed to common sense and common people (in the
sense that it overcomes the dark cave of ignorance constituted by
common sense and common people), but also endows scientific
institutions with the legitimacy to criticize, frame and guide common
sense and common people, denying its autonomy to constitute itself as
a normative arena, epistemological-political subjects with conditions
to construct valid practices and codes beyond scientific-political
institutions.
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The scientific institution’s illusion of truth is the basis of the
contraposition between scientific institution, on the one hand, and, on
the other, common sense and common people, marking a scientific
institutional self-comprehension which has streamlined the history and
the constitution of Western philosophical-theological-scientific thought
until our days, although today there is a very fast epistemological-
political deconstruction of this scientific illusion of truth, this strict
epistemological-moral objectivity. Such kind of illusion is the basic
Platonic normative legacy and it entails many correlative characteristics:
first, epistemological-moral objectivity is the condition of relativism,
particularism and subjectivism; second, objectivity is located beyond
common sense, since it cannot be accessed by common people, becoming
fundamentally an institutional matter, procedure and practice; third,
scientific institution is the only arena, procedure, practice and legal
staff from which epistemological-political objectivity is constructed and
grounded; fourth, epistemological-political objectivity is the foundation
of institutional political power and can lend legitimacy to political
institutions; fifth, institutional philosophy/theology/science becomes
the paradigm of validation of all justified knowledge and political
practices, of both institutions and everyday life. Now, such a scientific
institutional illusion of truth means that institutions can ground a very
strict epistemological-political objectivity, from internal methods,
procedures, practices and a trained legal staff. Therefore, this illusion of
truth means that it is possible to construct, from and by scientific
institutions, an objective epistemological-moral paradigm based on an
essentialist and naturalized foundation that cannot be developed from
common sense and by common people. This philosophical/theological/
scientific self-comprehension has constituted the basic point of unity
in the evolution of Western thought over time, which allows placing
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume,
Kant and Hegel, or even Husserl, Heidegger and the first Wittgenstein
in the same context–the context of a scientific worldview based on strong
institutionalism regarding the legitimation and the constitution of
scientific institutions and their relations with common sense and
common people. All of them start from the contraposition to common
sense and common people and presuppose that epistemological-moral
objectivity is the condition of discourse and scientific knowledge:
common sense and common people are the sources of epistemological-
moral confusion and nonsense, exactly because of their lack of conceptual
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clarity, epistemological objectivity—which can be provided by
institutionalized science, by an institutionalized scientific praxis.
Strong institutionalism regarding epistemological-moral foundation
is the basic legacy of the Platonic model of foundation, of the
philosophical/theological/scientific illusion of truth, of the strict
epistemological-moral objectivity. Strong institutionalism implies the
fact that philosophical/theological/scientific institutions centralize and
monopolize the constitution, legitimation and evolution of the scientific
field, directly legitimizing a kind of political institution that guides,
frames and defines the dynamics and everyday life of common sense
and common people over time. Strong institutionalism has, as a
consequence, the centrality of scientific institution regarding the
constitution of everyday life and of political power, in a way that
establishes institutions as the basic core of social life and social evolution
beyond the participation of common sense and common people in
epistemological and political terms. Strong institutionalism is based
both on the contraposition between institutional science and
spontaneous common sense, and on the scientific institutional
affirmation of an essentialist and naturalized foundation as the
groundwork of epistemological-moral objectivity. This double
characteristic of the constitution of scientific institutions allows the
institutional self-comprehension of its superiority regarding common
sense and common people, as its centrality concerning the grounding
of an objective scientific worldview which is the condition of discourse
and practice. From here, the scientific discussion and criticism in terms
of the grounding of knowledge is basically an internal matter and
practice based on internal procedures and performed by institutional
self-authorized people. From here, esoteric institutional practices, codes
and procedures are a different and special thing in relation to exoteric
results that are easily digested and understood by common sense and
common people. In other words, strong institutionalism as the result
of the Platonic model of institutional philosophical/theological/scientific
foundation institutes the centrality of the scientific institution regarding
the constitution, legitimation and social foment of valid objective
knowledge and, accordingly, of the institutional political practices
concerning social life. Here, the contraposition between scientific-
political institutions and common sense, between scientist/bureaucrat
and common people pervades and constitutes strong institutionalism
and its relationships with common sense and common people. The
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same way, the correlation between strong institutionalism and strong
epistemological-moral-ontological objectivity consolidates the
construction, legitimation and social boosting of the valid knowledge-
praxis as an internal and technical-logical matter-procedure centralized
and monopolized by scientific institution, by its self-authorized legal
staff. Here, a strong institutionalism based on a fundamentalist
procedure and arena defines all the possible epistemological-moral-
ontological objectivity, beyond common people and common sense.
It is interesting that the notion of rationality has four senses in the
Western philosophical tradition, which legitimate the centrality of
scientific institution regarding common sense and common people. First,
rationality means scientific objectivity based on an essentialist and
naturalized foundation, something that is opposed to common sense
and common people, legitimizing scientific institution as the core of
epistemological-political grounding; second, it signifies the logical
construction of knowledge, the respect to at least the three principles of
Aristotelian classical logics (identity, non-contradiction and third
excluded); third, rationality means, according to the modern philosophy
of the subject, self-justification based on impartial, neutral and
procedural reasons, which leads to a decentered and universal
consciousness (non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric), opposed to the
traditional mind, which is attached to its own context (becoming
egocentric and ethnocentric); fourth, it signifies the possibility of
intersubjective dialog and cooperation, putting itself in the place of
others (as post-metaphysical thinking does). In the four characteristics
of rationality, and mainly in the first three, a form of scientism can be
perceived, which is contrary to the pluralism and heterogeneity of
common sense. Such scientific rationality implies that the
epistemological-moral grounding is not a task that can be performed
by the use of everyday values and practices, or by everyday thinking,
because it requires the philosophical-scientific capability to objectively
and impartially justify a kind of normativism that has no historical-
cultural-linguistic roots and contextualization, a kind of normativism
that has no carnality and politicity. To think objectively is to think in a
formal, impartial, neutral, impersonal and procedural way, meaning
that the thinker has reached the universal point of view from which
criticizing, legitimizing and framing are possible. Common sense and
common people do not allow such formalism, impartiality, neutrality,
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impersonality and proceduralism regarding the grounding of binding
notions of value and practice. As a consequence, a rational way of life
and grounding acquires a scientific sense which is streamlined by
philosophical/theological/scientific institution: that is the most basic
characteristic of Western thought and culture in terms of
epistemological-moral foundation and regarding the institutional
definition of a kind of scientific rationality as the basis of that
epistemological grounding. Here again, a logical, formal, impartial,
impersonal and neutral form of rationality and of epistemological-
political grounding is only possible through the institution’s internal
procedures, codes, practices and legal staff, not from common sense
and by common people.
A Western Model of Institutional Scientific Community and the
Foundation of Rationality: The Correlation between Strong
Objectivity and Strong Institutionalism
The Western model of institutional community is the normative-
political core regarding the constitution, foundation and streamlining
of a notion of epistemological-moral objectivity to common sense and
common people; it is the basic normative-political core concerning the
construction of a valid notion of knowledge and moral praxis to common
sense and common people. Plato’s normative legacy – the philosophical/
theological/scientific institution as the core of the epistemological-
political foundation, institution as the very platform of legitimation,
based on an essentialist and naturalized foundation, which leads to the
opposition to common sense and common people, as to institutional
fundamentalism (strong institutionalism and strong epistemological-
moral-ontological objectivity) – was consolidated as the natural pathway
of Western scientific institutional constitution, as the epistemological-
political self-understanding with respect to Western scientific
institutional evolution. Likewise, Plato’s normative legacy puts
objectivity as the epistemological-political condition of particularity,
so the Western philosophical/theological/scientific institutional tradition
consolidated by medieval Catholic theology has instituted such idea
regarding the theoretical-practical foundation: Without epistemological-
moral objectivity, there is no legitimacy, sense and justification. Here
there is a correlation which is the normative legitimation of the scientific
institution’s centralization and monopolization of the epistemological-
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moral foundation, namely the interdependence between strong
objectivity (or just objectivity) and strong institutionalism. According
to Plato, epistemological-moral objectivity is the condition to
intersubjective meaning. Therefore, without such an epistemological-
moral objectivity there is no comprehension and guided collective action.
If values and practices are not based on consistent epistemological-moral
objectivity, then relativism, subjectivism and, as a consequence,
skepticism are the basic normative patterns which ground an
“epistemological-moral anything goes.” This is another of Plato’s
normative legacies, that is, the affirmation that, without objectivity,
skepticism – which is a bad thing epistemologically and morally speaking
– leads to an “anything goes.” Objectivity is the very fundamental
condition for individual and social stability – and that is the major
scientific institutional aim, the greatest task of scientific institution in
order to save common sense and common people of the darkness of the
cave.
The correlation which emerges here, therefore, is the deep association
between epistemological-moral objectivity and scientific institution, that
is, the fact that scientific institution grounds an objective
epistemological-moral paradigm to frame, guide, criticize and orientate
both the institution itself and common sense and common people.
Epistemological-moral objectivity becomes not only an institutional
task beyond common sense and common people, but also a very
institutional property, in the sense that scientific institution centralizes
and monopolizes the constitution, legitimation and social foment of
this objective epistemological-moral paradigm, from the (institutional)
justification that common sense and common people lack such an
objective scientific worldview. This correlation between scientific
objectivity and scientific institution leads to strong institutionalism
regarding the constitution, legitimation and social foment of the valid
knowledge and grounding of an institutional political praxis that can
orientate and frame common sense and common people. This correlation
enables the institution’s self-comprehension and political power to guide
social evolution as a whole from its internal practices, procedures, codes
and legal staff, in a vertical sense from top to bottom. Here, the scientific
institution assumes a pastoral sense, since it becomes the judge of culture,
legitimating from its internal constitution and grounding what is and
what is not valid knowledge, what is and what is not civilized culture.
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In other words, scientific institution legitimizes from within the entire
external social-cultural context and dynamics, which also implies the
fact that the philosopher/theologian/scientist, from his bureau, acquires
an epistemological-political power that frames social life and common
people as a whole. On this point, the Platonic separation between esoteric
and exoteric texts/practices also means the centrality and superiority of
the esoteric institutional role regarding exoteric common sense and
common people. Now, how is it possible? As said above, by the
correlation between strong objectivity and scientific institution, which
leads to strong institutionalism and institutional fundamentalism
concerning the constitution, foundation and social foment of an objective
epistemological-moral paradigm, which means as consequence the
institutional self-referentiality, self-subsistence and autonomy regarding
common sense and common people.
Truth is objective, and the political sphere is based on truth. Truth
is an institutional matter, made possible only by scientific institution;
as a consequence, political praxis is based on scientific institution’s
internal procedures, practices, codes, legal staff and contents, which
were constructed by institutional science. This is the Western traditional
way with respect to a triple correlation: first, the relationship between
institutional science and common sense and common people; second,
the link between scientific institution and political power; third, the
profound link between truth and political legitimacy. This triple
correlation grounds a model of epistemological-moral foundation that
presupposes strong objectivity as a condition to particularism, as the
truth of particularism, which means that the Enlightenment is
fundamentally a scientific institutional way and sense. The strong
objectivity constructed by a philosophical/theological/scientific
institution enables the framing, the grounding and the guiding of
common sense and common people, so that this strong objectivity leads
to strong institutionalism in terms of constitution, legitimation and
social foment of the valid knowledge and cultural-political practices,
since scientific institution centralizes and monopolizes such a scientific
task. On this point, as I ever said above, the scientific institution becomes
self-referential, self-subsisting and autonomous regarding common sense
and common people, becoming also closed to them and acquiring a
depoliticized and technical core-role.
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In Plato’s normative legacy, scientific institution implies the effective
epistemological-moral objectivity as its basis and core. On the other
hand, common sense and common people is its opposite, associated
with relativism, subjectivism, particularism and inability to think in a
universal way and sense. Therefore, the scientific institution is the
counterpoint to common sense and common people, as epistemological-
moral objectivity is the opposite of common sense’s relativism,
subjectivism and particularism. Scientific institution and its objective
epistemological-moral paradigm that leads to truth are not only the
counterpoint to common sense and common people, but also their
truth, their sense. And it is from scientific institution allied to political
power that the normative framing, guiding and orientation are possible.
The dark cave of common sense can be overcome by scientific institution
as much as common people are well guided by the institutional
philosopher. The fact is that Plato has developed the idea that knowledge
is an institutional matter and praxis by a scientific institutional
community that can ground an objective epistemological-moral
paradigm. Such objective epistemological-moral paradigm overcomes
the relativism and particularism of common sense and common people,
in other words, its ignorance. Here, epistemological-political objectivity
as a scientific institutional matter and praxis provides scientific
institution with the power not only to centralize and monopolize the
legitimation of valid knowledge, but also to frame and guide common
sense and common people in their evolution over time.
Western scientific institutional culture and its profound link with
objectivity are in the foundations of strong institutionalism, which is a
very basic characteristic of the Western scientific institution and of its
self-understanding regarding both the construction and the grounding
of valid knowledge and concerning the very scientific institutional
relationships with common sense and common people (see Habermas,
1989). Here, scientific institution centralizes and monopolizes the
constitution and legitimation of epistemological-moral objectivity. Now,
if epistemological-moral objectivity is the only normative condition to
pluralism and subjectivism, then scientific institution, in the moment
that it – and only it – has the capability to ground objectivity and
streamline it over time – becomes the core both epistemologically and
politically, since scientific institution is the societal basis par excellence,
because it is from such scientific institution that social-cultural evolution
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is planned and carried out. And it is here that the Platonic
contraposition between scientific institution and common sense,
philosopher/theologian/scientist and common people acquires a
political-cultural sense that defines the Western scientific institutional
history and evolution up to our days: the epistemological-moral
objectivity is a monopoly of scientific institution, since it is provided
by the philosopher/theologian/scientist, not by common sense and
common people. The discussions and practices related to the
construction of valid knowledge and to the constitution of socially
binding valid culture are always an institutional matter, monopoly and
practice, so that institutional science and political power are very close
and correlated in the constitution and evolution of Western thought.
In Western cultural evolution, institutional dynamics has the centrality
with respect to epistemological-political contents and practices, beyond
common sense and common people. Strong institutionalism regarding
epistemological-political foundations means exactly the centrality of
scientific institution, as its monopolization of the legitimation of the
social-cultural constitution and evolution. Here, the masses are not the
subject of epistemological-political grounding, which belongs to
scientific institutions. As said above, the centrality of scientific institution
is possible through the correlation between scientific institution and
epistemological-moral objectivity as the basic point both of scientific
institution’s self-understanding and of institutional relationships with
common sense and common people.
This is a very crucial epistemological-political challenge to
contemporary philosophy, which it has pursued to deconstruct in many
ways and senses. Indeed, one of the more important epistemological-
political steps of contemporary philosophy is the refusal of strong
objectivity regarding the epistemological-moral-ontological foundation
and, as a consequence, the gradual renunciation of the contraposition
between scientific institution and common sense, as well as of that
between philosopher/theologian/scientist and common people.
Philosophy/theology/science continue as an institutional matter,
practice, procedure and community, but, from the moderation of that
Platonic self-understanding, contemporary institutional science does
not endorse such a strong objectivity epistemologically and politically
speaking (exception to theology, which continues using an essentialist
and naturalized basis, affirming the correlation between strong
institutionalism and strong epistemological-moral-ontological
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objectivity as its dynamics of constitution, legitimation, evolution and
interpretation and social foment of the creed), as contemporary thought
weakens an essentialist and naturalized foundation which was the basis
of the self-understanding of Platonic scientific institution. This means
that the institutional community’s task of epistemological-moral
grounding becomes more modest, more humble, in that institutional
philosophy/theology/science renounces the centralization and
monopolization of such an epistemological-political foundation,
attributing it to common sense and common people, to a democratic
praxis that decides how legitimation is possible and its contents. When
we study second Wittgenstein, Rorty, Rawls and Habermas, for example,
we can see exactly such philosophical renunciation of an essentialist
and naturalized foundation as the basis of the self-understanding of
philosophical/theological/scientific institution and, as a consequence,
the affirmation that what remains to philosophical praxis is the
abandonment of the institutional centralization and monopolization of
the epistemological-moral grounding in favor of a deliberative democratic
praxis that involves common sense and common people. Here, the
philosopher/theologian/scientist is a citizen like any other, he/she is
not superior regarding common people as much as scientific institution
is not superior regarding common sense. Therefore, the most important
transformation of contemporary philosophy is characterized by the
refusal of both strong epistemological-moral objectivity and of the
correlative strong institutionalism with respect to the epistemological-
moral grounding and of its social foment by scientific institution (see
Wittgenstein, 1999; Rorty, 1995; Rawls, 1990; Habermas, 1990).
What, then, is the function of institutional philosophy/theology/
science? It should contribute with the strengthening of cultural-political
democracy, not replace it. It acquires meaning in contributing with the
improvement of the democratic political praxis by fomenting critical
normative perspectives based on the discussion between plural
individuals and groups. It also enables popular criticism regarding
institutions or social systems, which leads to the refusal of strong
institutionalism as the basis of the organization and legitimation of the
very social systems. Indeed, this is a very important task of—and for—
contemporary institutional philosophy/theology/science, namely the
deconstruction of strong institutionalism in all areas of society, like
economy, politics, law, religion, culture, mass media, education and
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others (see ALVES, 1981). As said above, the concept of strong
institutionalism means, as it is being used here, the fact that institutions
or social systems centralize and monopolize the constitution, the
comprehension, the legitimation and the social boosting of their specific
areas of functioning and programing, closing it both to democratic
political praxis and to a binding notion of social normativity, becoming
depoliticized and technical-logical institutions, very impersonal and
unpolitical regarding common sense and common people. Strong
institutionalism implies that the social system or institution becomes
the very social field which it centralizes and monopolizes, autonomizing
it from the social context and, therefore, from the political praxis in
which it is rooted. In this case, the institution becomes a technical,
logical and procedural structure which is only understood, streamlined
and transformed by its internal practices, procedures, codes and legal
staff, renouncing a political-normative constitution and transformation.
Here, in strong institutionalism, common sense and common people
have no voice and participation, which are monopolized by the
institutional elites based on a technical and logical, non-political and
non-normative procedures. This is a Platonic legacy that must be
deconstructed by a democratic political praxis streamlined and fomented
by institutional philosophy/theology/science, by institutional
philosophers/theologians/scientists from an epistemological-political
standpoint characterized by institutional limitation in favor of common
sense and common people.
This can be achieved by the permanent and pungent theoretical-
political deconstruction of the correlation between scientific institution
and objectivity, by the theoretical-political deconstruction of strong
institutionalism as the basis of institutional structuration and of social
evolution beyond common sense and common people. The
epistemological-political foundation – even the institutional grounding,
constitution and evolution – belongs to the people; it is a democratic
matter and praxis, not purely institutional at all. Democracy is the only
way and principle for epistemological-moral foundations, and it
deconstructs essentialist and naturalized foundations as the basis not
only of social evolution, but of institutional constitution and legitimation
as well. The Platonic model of strong institutionalism based on the
correlation between scientific institutional community and strong
objectivity, based also on the contraposition between scientific
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institutional community and common sense and common people, is
no longer valid as the basis of philosophical/theological/scientific
institution, as well as an essentialist and naturalized foundation cannot
be affirmed as the condition of the institution’s epistemological-political
centrality and monopolization of socially binding normativity and its
grounding. This Platonic era is over; now is the time of democracy,
including within philosophical/theological/scientific institutional
communities. From now on, objectivity results from a democratic praxis,
even if it means the permanent victory of relativism, subjectivism,
particularism, that is, the epistemological-political centrality of common
sense and common people, and no longer of the philosophical/
theological/scientific institution that cannot assume the entire
legitimation and orientation of social-cultural evolution nor constitute
itself as an autonomous and closed community that monopolizes the
epistemological-political grounding, imposing it with no mediations
on common sense and common people.
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